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Bridging the Spheres: Political and Personal
Conversation in Public and Private Spaces
By Robert O. Wyatt, Elihu Katz, and Joohan Kim
For some theorists, talk about politics is infrequent, difficult, divisive, and, to be efficacious,
must proceed according to special rules in protected spaces. We, however, examined
ordinary political conversation in common spaces, asking Americans how freely and how
often they talked about 9 political and personal topics at home, work, civic organizations,
and elsewhere. Respondents felt free to talk about all topics. Most topics were talked about
most frequently at home and at work, suggesting that the electronic cottage is wired to the
public sphere. Political conversation in most loci correlated significantly with opinion quality
and political participation, indicating that such conversation is a vital component of actual
democratic practice, despite the emphasis given to argumentation and formal deliberation by
some normative theorists.

Given the dictum, "Two things I never talk about in public are politics and religion," the
troublesome fall in news consumption, a continuing slippage in voter turnout, and the
controversy swirling around citizens' distrust of government and the decline of America's
"social capital" (Putnam, 1995a, 1995b), 1 there is little wonder that questions abound about
how little, how reluctantly, and where, if at all, Americans talk about politics. This debate
proceeds, incidentally, despite empirical evidence that civic participation is alive and well
(Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1996; Pew Research Center for the People & the
Press, 1997) and that political conversation is far from a dying art (Wyatt, Katz, & Kim,
1997).

1
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proposed by Putnam (1995a, 1995b).
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The issue is complicated by the imprecise and shifting nature of the terms used to
describe the nature of talk about political matters. We might assume, for example, that talk
about politics involves the willingness to argue with a political opponent (who may be a
stranger), and that such talk would be impeded by the perception of a hostile opinion climate
(e.g., Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Political talk also might mean deliberation or debate according
to formal rules in protected spaces such as legislative assemblies or civic organizations (e.g.,
Schudson, 1997). Or, talk about politics might refer to informal conversation among
acquaintances about governmental happenings reported in the news (e.g., Tarde, 1901/1989).
Regardless of the democratic benefits of purposeful argumentation with ideological
opponents or the merits of structured deliberation in formal assemblies, what we term
ordinary political conversation within the context of daily life forms the focus of our
attention. For it is in this ordinary conversation about politics which may at times include
informal deliberation or spirited argumentation as well as casual discussion-that we,
following Tarde, believe democratic culture receives its most concrete realization. In this
study, then, we seek to chart empirically how often Americans converse about politics in
various common loci, that is, at home, at work, at worship, in organizations, out in
commercial spaces, even in e-mail. We seek to define what subject domains characterize
political conversation in an era of shifting boundaries, whether such conversation includes
crime, national or local government, the economy, education, religion, personal matters, or
foreign affairs. Finally, we seek to understand how freely citizens talk about each of these
conversational domains. We then employ survey data to map the shifting nature of political
conversation from locus to locus and to develop a redefined, empirically based model of
conversational democracy.
We propose that the conversation model of democracy that we discover and explicate is
appropriate for an age in which the natures of politics and public space are being
reconstituted through new and ubiquitous media technologies that center in the home. In the
process, we modify the important work of a number of prominent normative theorists of the
public sphere. Though we acknowledge that normative theorists may justly argue that public
life would be greatly improved by more widespread formal deliberation and freer purposeful
argumentation, we believe that informal conversation among people who largely agree with
each other plays a more vital role in democratic processes than is usually recognized. As
empiricists, we seek to describe this role; as students of normative theory, we also suggest
that democracy can be enriched if the role of informal political conversation is appreciated
and such conversation encouraged along with other forms of political discourse.

The Literature on Talk and Politics
Continuing his crusade against loose talk about "the public sphere," Michael Schudson
(1997) challenges the axiom that "conversation is the soul of democracy." Political
conversation, asserts Schudson, is an oxymoron. By conversation, he reminds us, we mean
talk for its own sake among intimates, usually social equals, unbridled by an agenda,
unrestrained by rules except those of turn taking, civility, and offering pleasure. On the other
hand, talk about politics, what we term formal deliberation, is often painful, says Schudson.

It implies an agenda, prescribed rules of order to protect weaker members, and
purposefulness; it is oriented toward decision making and the writing of laws. It must proceed
instrumentally among interlocutors who disagree-searching for solutions and resolutions. 2
Schudson is asking us, in effect, to reopen the question of whether casual conversation or
organizational affiliations underwrite democratic governance. Implicitly, he is challenging
our readings of Tocqueville (1840/1969), Dewey (1927), and, more recently, Putnam (1995a;
1995b; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti 1993), Barber (1984), and others. For Schudson, one
infers, participatory democracy is the product of deliberate talk about public affairs, not the
melange of chatter that goes on in coffeehouses and offices, even if talk of politics emerges
now and then along with other idle matters.
As with all good theory, Schudson's challenge realigns the thought of earlier theorists
who, before the challenge, all seemed to belong to one camp. Now, we can see that a
spectrum of opinion about talk ranges between two poles-from those who hold that casual
conversation and informal association include political topics that breed public opinion to
those who hold, with Schudson, that conversation and political talk are different things.
With Schudson, other important researchers conclude that politics is divisive and that it
is often avoided in casual talk. This is implicit in Noelle-Neumann's (1993) silent minority
and in Eliasoph's (1998) ethnography of informal associations, in which even avowedly
political groups avoid politics lest they alienate each other or be alienated from the larger
society. Postman's (1985) critique of television as unable to sustain a rational argument also
shares this view, however implicitly.
Barber (1984) is chief spokesperson of the perspective that ordinary conversation and
politics are not inimical:

At the heart of strong democracy is talk. As we shall see, talk is not
mere speech.... Talk remains central to politics, which would ossify
completely without its creativity, its variety, its openness and
flexibility, its inventiveness, its capacity for discovery, its subtlety
and complexity, its eloquence, its potential for empathy and affective
expression, and its deeply paradoxical (some would say dialectical)
character that displays man's [sic] full nature as a purposive,
interdependent, and active being. (pp. 173-174)

Habermas (1962/1989) seems somewhere in between. On the one hand, his "public
sphere" requires participants to check their status at the door in order to nullify self-interest,
ensure equality, and permit rationality to guide the discussion toward an optimal solution for
the commonwealth. On the other hand, he points to London coffeehouses and French cafes
and salons as the ideal loci for such conversations. As "communicative actions" in the public
2
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think of adversarial conversation when he observes that such talk has "invaded the household~ and bears the "seeds of
rights-consciousness.”

sphere, maintains Habermas, conversations should be altogether different from "strategic
actions" in the political system, such as formal discussion and rule-based, rational debates.
Also occupying a middle ground is Simonson (1996) in his analysis of several
communication theorists' "dreams of democratic togetherness." For Simonson, political talk
takes place variously in various spaces, including "lifestyle enclaves," voluntary associations,
and community gathering places. The least amount of important political talk, he argues,
takes place in lifestyle enclaves; voluntary associations are the most formal and clearly
bounded spaces for significant discussion and community gathering places occupy a middle
ground.
Aligning themselves with Barber are other philosophers of ordinary political conversation.
Here we find writers like Gabriel Tarde (1901/1989), who thought that the informal
conversation of cafes and salons mediated between press reports of the political agenda and a
considered public opinion, a point reiterated by Herbst (1994). This understanding of political
conversation is also consistent with the observations of Tocqueville (1840/1969) and Bryce
(1891), those noted 19thcentury students of American democratic life. Smith and Zipp (1983)
found that informal personal relationships with party officials promoted frequent political
discussions that, in turn, enhanced citizens' political participation. Lazarsfeld's (Katz &
Lazarsfeld, 1955) two-step flow implies, too, that conversation about consumer behavior,
fashion, movie going, and public affairs are the subjects of everyday talk among members of
the public and their opinion leaders.
Among contemporaries, Gamson (1992) would take this side, at least in the sense of
implying that ordinary people are capable of discussing politics in the same ways that they
discuss other things. In his analysis of focus-group interchanges, Gamson finds that his
subjects may not readily recall many of the "facts" of political life, but they are perfectly
capable of discussing political issues that affect them with reasonable sophistication and
civility. In a similar vein, Delli Carpini and Williams (1994, 1996) find that focus-group
participants use both informational and fictional television programs as stimuli for talk about
politics- even, on occasion, talking back to the screen-a finding that affirms the link between
news, informal conversation, and the construction of public opinion.
Concerning the freedom with which people speak in ordinary circumstances, Wyatt et al.
(Wyatt, 1991; Wyatt, Katz, Levinsohn, & Al-Haj, 1996) measured how free respondents felt
to speak up in 10 public and private communication environments in the United States and
among Arabs and Jews in Israel. In all three cultures, respondents felt "very free" to speak up
in their own home or the homes of intimate associates. However, they felt only "somewhat
free" in more inhibiting public locales such as the workplace or meetings of civic
organizations. The researchers also found that, in all three cultures, issues of sociability and
the fear of harming or offending others proved generally more important in inhibiting
conversation than concerns about personal disapproval, marginalization, surveillance, or
punishment. Although these findings do not apply exclusively to politics, they suggest that
civil conversation is the norm across cultures and that talk, even in public spaces, is not
markedly impeded by internal or external restraints. If these studies provide any clue, the
more intimate circles should be the loci of the greatest amount of political conversation, and
it should be informal in nature.

Still, surprisingly little empirical evidence exists about the nature and amount of political
conversation and the relation of such conversation to news use, opinion quality, and political
participation. This inattention to talk in general, and to political talk in particular, is
evidenced in the General Social Survey (1999); only twice in its history stretching back to the
early 1970s has the GSS included questions about political talk. Our best continuous source
of data about U.S. presidential elections, the National Election Studies (1999), has included
talk variables since 1984, but the items have usually been asked on the reinterview after the
election, limiting their usefulness. Even these data, however, indicate that political
conversation is far from infrequent among ordinary Americans (Wyatt, Katz, & Kim, 1997).
The relation between news use and interpersonal communication has been probed by a
number of scholars, though Chaffee and Mutz (1988) remind us that the use of
noncomparable scales and varying amounts of error may make comparisons difficult. In a
reexamination of the two-step flow theory, Robinson (1976) affirmed that, when
interpersonal and mass media sources are compared or in conflict, interpersonal sources can
be expected to exercise greater influence, though news media may produce stronger gross
effects because of wider use. Interpersonal communication has also been found to enhance
media agenda-setting under certain conditions (McLeod, Becker, & Byrnes, 1974), though it
can also function as a better predictor of issue salience than news use does (Wanta & Wu,
1992). In addition, interpersonal communication seems capable of performing a "bridging
function" between respondents' perceptions of problems as personal and as societal issues
(Mutz, 1989, May; Weaver, Zhu, & Willnat, 1992).
Talk about issues in the news has also been shown to increase markedly respondents'
understanding of the news itself (Robinson & Levy, 1986; Robinson & Davis, 1990). Further,
controversial issues that prompt wide discussion have been shown to decrease the size of
knowledge gaps among populations (Tichenor, Donohue, & alien, 1980).
The effect of interpersonal communication on vote choice, particularly during elections,
is the focus of other studies in political communication (e.g., Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995;
Lenart, 1994; Mondak, 1995). Mondak (1995), for example, addressed the relation of news
use and political talk in Pittsburgh and Cleveland during a Pittsburgh newspaper strike,
finding no significant difference in frequency of interpersonal discussion or the perception of
discussion quality between the newspaper city and the strike city. He did not, however,
attribute great importance to this finding because Pittsburgh voters readily found substitute
information for presidential and senatorial campaigns. In House races, however, where
alternate information sources were scarce, Pittsburgh residents reported considerably less
talk.
Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995), in a neighborhood-based consideration of the role of talk in
election campaigns, queried urban respondents about the people they talked with most about
"events of the past election year." Political conversation, they found, is not just a family affair.
More than half of frequent discussants were nonrelatives. About two thirds of their
respondents reported discussing politics with contacts "only once in a while," a figure rather
constant regardless of the type of relationship. Concerning the loci of political conversation,
about 70% of discussants lived in the same neighborhood, worked in the same place, or both.
Across relationship categories, only about 10-15% reported disagreeing with discussants
"often." Clearly most of this political discussion is not rational-critical debate in rule-bound

assemblies among partisans painfully divided by ideology. The researchers also discovered
that discussant influence on vote choice is greatest within families, if respondents correctly
perceived their discussants' preferences and if respondents agreed with those preferences. The
weight of the evidence here, then, favors a model of informal political influence--of
respondents behaving the way they think people of a similar social position should behave
based on environmental cues-rather than a model based on rational debate, explicit
persuasion, or rule-bound discourse. Unfortunately, Huckfeldt and Sprague generally ignore
media use in their models.

Research Questions
Given the vagaries surrounding definitions of what constitutes politics, the frequent focus on
vote choice or issue salience as the dependent variable, and the wide neglect of the variety of
"spaces" within which conversations about politics emerge, we set out to devise a more
expansive method for measuring ordinary conversation about political and personal topics.
Within this context, we addressed empirically a number of questions:
First we asked what "politics" means for ordinary Americans. Does the phrase "talking
about politics" focus attention too narrowly on the workings of government itself, on
personalities, bureaucratic institutions, campaigning, "courthouse" and inside-the-Beltway
issues, and not enough on the wide variety of topics that have broader political relevance in
the ordinary conversations of everyday life? Is talk about education or crime included when
respondents say that they participate in conversations about politics? When they talk about
education and crime, do they focus more narrowly on domestic issues concerning the safety
and wellbeing of the family? Is talk about the economy a political issue for them, or is it more
closely related to personal issues?
We also wondered how different spaces affect the ways various topics are talked about.
Are topics such as crime and education considered political, in the sense that they are
discussed alongside governmental concerns, if the discussion is held in public loci? Are the
same subjects considered personal when discussed at home, where crime may be an intense
proximate concern? To address these questions, we developed a battery of nine relatively
specific items concerning national and state government, the economy, personal and family
matters, religion, entertainment, and the like, avoiding the term politics in any of our
questions. We then asked respondents to estimate how much they talked about these items in
different places.
Given the common propensity to distinguish between the public and private dimensions
of life both among theorists of democracy and in lay discourse, we theorized that the nine
items would cluster into public and private-or political and personal-factors or facets when
analyzed by factor analysis and multidimensional scaling techniques designed to probe latent
relationships. Thus, a priori, we defined national and state government as the center of the
public sphere and personal and family matters as the center of the private sphere, knowing, of
course, that these terms are used elastically by some scholars and restrictively by others.3
Further, we sought to determine how free respondents felt to converse about each of the
subject domains in general. We believed that, if political conversation was conceived of as a

divisive, difficult, threatening, or segregated activity, respondents should feel substantially
less free to talk about the public-affairs items than about other issues. If, however,
respondents felt as free to talk about political topics as other matters, the interpretations of
Schudson and others would be called into question or, at least, the fact that ordinary political
conversation occurs within congenial environments would be established.
We thus focused on four questions: How much do respondents engage in talk about
various subject-specific items in general and in different loci? How free in general do
respondents feel to talk about these items? Do these items cluster into public and private
domains? Do certain items change their identity from public to private in different loci?

Method
Survey Sample
To address these questions, a nationwide telephone survey of 1,029 adults from the 50 U.S.
states was conducted in May 1996 using computer-assisted interviewing and random digit
dialing. Once an eligible English-speaking household was contacted, respondents were
systematically chosen, rotating gender and age. Fifty-six percent of the sample was female.
For age, 31% were 18-34, 35% were 35-49, 20% were 50-64, and 15% were 65 and older.
Whites made up 84% of the sample; Blacks, 9%; and those of other or mixed race, 7%4
Instrument
Respondents were asked whether they talked about each of nine content-specific items
"often," "sometimes," "seldom," or "never." We asked first about the amount of talk "in
general" and then in each of six loci: the personal home and the homes of friends and family;
clubs, community and civic organizations; worship; bars, restaurants, and shopping malls
surrounded by both friends and strangers; work; and e-mail or on the Internet. We also asked
how free, in general, subjects felt to talk about these items (“very,” “somewhat,” “slightly,”
or “not at all”).
The nine content-specific items included "what the President, the national government
and the Congress are doing,” “what your state and local government are doing,” “what is
happening in foreign countries,” “how the economy is doing,” “the crime situation and
violence in society,” “what is happening in your personal life and your family,” “what's going
on in the schools and education,” “your religion and religious beliefs,” and “what is

3

Our a priori definitions are consistent with the understanding articulated by Rawlins (1998) in a special issue of

Communication Theory (1998) devoted to examining the implications of and developments in our understanding of the
nature of the public and the private.
4
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units) was 56%, and the refusal rate (from all contacted eligible units) was 17%.

happening in sports, television, music, or the movies.” Items were presented to respondents in
random order within each locus in order to control for question-order effects.
Analysis
To define the deep structure of the variables underlying the nine talk items in each locus, we
used both exploratory factor analysis and multidimensional scaling together with Guttman's
(1968) facet theory. To produce the factors, we employed principal components analysis with
oblique rotation and an eigenvalue of 1 as a stop criterion. We used the results from the
exploratory factor analyses to provide a clue as to which questions should be assigned to
which categories, or “facets,” in Guttman facet theory. We felt certain that most items would
fall easily into political and personal facets, but we also wondered whether certain “bridge”
items might prove to be cross-factorial and, hence, might mediate between the public and
private. Thus, we speculated that topics such as crime or the economy might be talked about
in both personal and political terms, bridging the gap. However, we could only guess at
which items would be included in which facets, given the paucity of previous research. We
tested the resulting facets across the different loci, using smallest space analysis (SSA) as a
confirmatory procedure.
Here, we used Faceted Smallest Space Analysis (FSSA), a program developed by Shye
(1992; Shye, Elizur, & Hoffman, 1994) that first maps the items, then mathematically
partitions each conceptual map according to the predefined facets. The program also provides
a separation index ranging from 0-1 to assess how well each facet scheme fits the data. The
separation index may be interpreted much as Cronbach's alpha is used to measure the
reliability of additive scales.

Results
Overall Levels of Talk
The “general conversation” variables, that is, those without reference to loci, produced the
highest estimates of conversation, averaging more than “sometimes,” M = 3.13 out of 4.00,
across the nine subject domains (see Table 1). Among specific loci, respondents’ homes and
the homes of family and friends evidenced the greatest amounts of talk; at home, talk
averaged a bit above “sometimes” across the nine items. Next came talk at work, followed by
clubs and civic organizations, then place of worship. At place of worship, conversation about
public and private affairs is relatively sparse, between “seldom” and “sometimes.” Talk at
bars, restaurants, and malls among both friends and strangers evidenced even lower levels.
Then, in last place, came “talk” in e-mail or in Internet discussion groups, perhaps indicating
that most users employed this new medium for subjects other than those enumerated in the
questionnaire.
Exploratory Factor Analyses of Talk Items and Loci
To understand better the relation between the various subject-specific items, we conducted
exploratory factor analysis on the nine “general conversation” variables, with locus
unspecified. The analysis produced two factors: Political Conversation and Personal

Conversation (see Table 2). National government, local-state government, the economy, and
foreign happenings loaded highest on the Political Conversation factor. For talk in general,
then, Political Conversation is quite conventionally defined as talk about government, the
economy, and foreign affairs. Personal or family matters, religion, education, crime, and
entertainment sports loaded highest on Personal Conversation (see Table 2). Surprisingly,
then, in general conversation, crime and education were talked about more in terms of their
personal and family dimensions than their political relevance. Because of the moderate
loadings of the Personal Conversation items, it seems likely that the inclusion of additional
subjects might have split the factor into additional factors. Personal Conversation here
represents something of a miscei1any of items distinguished more by their difference from
Political Conversation than by their commonality. 5 The correlation between the two factors
was moderate (r = .37).
A similar structure is evident when the locus shifts to the home. Again, a Political
Conversation and a Personal Conversation factor emerge with much the same loading as the
general-talk variables (see Table 2). Crime, however, swings toward the political side and
even education takes on a more pronounced cross-factorial role, though still it loads higher on
the personal dimension. At home, this analysis suggests, crime and education bridge the gap
between political and personal conversation. Here, the factors account for a more robust 59%
of the variance. The cross-factor correlation, r = .50, again suggests that higher levels of one
kind of talk lead to higher levels of the other.
When we turn to the workplace, crime and education move definitively into the Political
Conversation column, indicating that the focus shifts to the public and governmental
dimension and away from the personal aspect of these two “bridge” variables (see Table 2).
Thus, as respondents move from place to place, they seem to talk about crime and education
in different ways.6 For talk at work, the two factors again displayed a healthy correlation, r
= 41.
When the locus shifts to an important component of the normative public sphere--clubs or
community and civic organizations—a pattern quite similar to the workplace again emerges
(see Table 2). Crime and education, though still bridging the factors, fall definitively into the
Political Conversation column. Thus, in such prototypical “public spaces,” crime and
education are viewed as government concerns, and the personal, family, and neighborhood
dimensions recede; perhaps the discussion is more rational-critical, more deliberative. Here
again, however, the correlation between factors is respectable, r = .45.

5 Although we initially designated the two factors Public Conversation and Private Conversation, we were concerned that
this might lead to confusion between talk about topics of public concern—our intended meaning—and talk in public spaces.
We also felt that those terms might imply greater theoretical distinction between public and private topics than our results
would justify.
6 A separate factor analysis of the home variables including only respondents who work produced loadings virtually
identical to the factor analysis of all respondents, confirming that the difference is a matter of loci, not respondents who
work versus all other respondents.

For the other loci of conversation, we will summarize findings only briefly. The worship
and restaurant-shopping spaces both produced single-factor solutions (see Table 2), perhaps
indicative of the lower levels of conversation in these places and the lack of differentiation
among subjects, when they are talked about at all. However, the political items were
predominant in the unrotated loadings. The e-mail environment (see Table 2) found the
economy loading highest on the Political factor, and personal/family matters loading highest
on Personal Conversation, conforming to a familiar pattern, though the sample is small (N =
132) and loadings are more extreme than in other environments.
Freedom to Talk About Each Subject
Respondents were also asked how free they felt “to talk about each of these subjects in
general whenever they come up in conversation.” Responses ranged from “very free” to “not
at all free” on four-point scales. The means for all items fell between very free and somewhat
free (see Table 1), indicating that respondents did not feel particularly inhibited when any
subject was raised. They felt freest to talk about crime, followed by sports, education, the
economy, state government, national government, foreign affairs, religion, and personal
matters. Subjects about which respondents felt most inhibited were personal, not political,
issues—countering any assumption that talk about politics is exceptionally painful. Of course,
it is also likely that such talk proceeds most often among people who know each other and
share a common worldview.
These nine items formed a highly reliable additive scale (Cronbach's α = .87), indicating
that freedom-to-talk transcends specific items. When controlled for age, education, income,
gender, and media use, there were good partial correlations between freedom-to-talk and the
reported amount of talk in each locus; freedom-to-talk proved a good predictor of talk across
subjects and loci. The strongest relation was between freedom-to-talk and the factor
representing general Political Conversation (partial r = .35), followed by Political
Conversation in organizations (partial r = .33), at home (partial r = .32), then the combined
factors at place of worship (partial r = .29) and out in public (partial r = .26). Weakest
correlations were with the Political Conversation factor in e-mail (partial r = .22) and in the
workplace (partial r = .21), perhaps indicating greater tension or greater reluctance in these
environments.
We also calculated compatibility between respondents' own political orientation and their
perception of the position of most of their family, friends, and acquaintances. On five-point
scales (far left through middle of the road to far right), 65% of respondents reported that they
and their intimate circle held the same general orientation, and 24% indicated that their
orientation diverged by only one unit. Interestingly, such compatibility was not significantly
related to the freedom to talk, perhaps because of its very ubiquity.
Confirmatory Smallest Space Analysis for Major Loci
Based on the exploratory factor analyses, the investigators engaged in further descriptive
analysis and confirmatory conceptual mapping using Faceted Smallest Space Analysis (Shye,
1992). Thus, we hypothesized the existence of a Political Facet and a Personal Facet, as

factor analyses of most loci suggested. We also added a Bridge Facet consisting of crime and
education because these topics seemed to span the political and the personal dimensions of
talk. This scheme, if confirmed by FSSA, should help us build a broader theory of talk about
political and personal subjects in different spaces.7
FSSA easily partitioned “general conversation” and each of the specific loci into a
Political Facet, a Personal Facet, and a Bridge Facet. Whether FSSA used parallel lines,
concentric circles, or radial lines to divide the space, the partitions fell into place around the
appropriate variables. For each locus, there was a perfect fit, separation index = 1.0,
confirming the generalizability of the facet scheme, despite shifting patterns from locus to
locus.8
Because available space limits the number of figures, we will present only two FSSA
maps-those for home (Figure 1) and work (Figure 2). These two spaces represent loci with

7 In offering this three-facet scheme, we reiterate that there are good correlations among the factors that emerged from factor
analysis. Thus, the facets, though distinct, are not radically separated from one another; they are bordering counties on a
small map of the conversational landscape. Although the names for the Political Facet, the Personal Facet, and the Bridge
Facet might be confused with the Political Conversation and Personal Conversation factors, we have taken care to capitalize
the words "facet" and “conversation" to distinguish the two.

8 A cursory examination of Figures 1 and 2 also will confirm that a two-facet Political-Personal scheme would scale
perfectly for either map, as it does in all other loci.

the highest mean levels of talk and the largest numbers of respondents (see Table 1). They
also illustrate the greatest contrasts among the seven possible maps. Still, in overall pattern,
maps for all loci are remarkably similar. The distances among variables shift, but their
relative locations remain much the same. From map to map, the direction of the axes may
rotate, but that is a trivial artifact of scaling. Though not depicted, we will still describe the
maps for each locus.
As is readily apparent in Figure 1, in the home, the four definitive political variables are
closely clustered opposite the single variable measuring conversation about personal and
family matters. Buffering the Political and the Personal Facets are the Bridge Facet variables
of crime and education, which fall at the center. At work and at some other loci, these bridge
variables will swing over toward the public side. In factor analysis for the home, one should
recall, crime loaded highest on the Political Conversation factor, while education loaded
highest on Personal Conversation, though both proved cross-factorial.
Also notable in this diagram is the wide spacing among the three personal items. Talk
about personal matters is about as close to the political variables as it is to chat about sports
and entertainment, and crime and education are about as near to the political items as to any
of the Personal Facet variables. If the left-to-right axis of the FSSA map can be interpreted as
representing the political-personal pole, the top-to-bottom axis might range from the most
serious or cloaked subject (religion) to the most trivial and open matter (sports-entertainment).
Given such an interpretation, the political items, the bridge items, and talk about personal and

family matters are all of intermediate seriousness or openness. One should not be misled by
the amount of space separating variables in this or any other concept map-the Political Facet
and the Personal Facet variables are significantly correlated. This is a map of a small space
indeed.
When we turn to "general conversation" with locus unspecified, FSSA produced a map
virtually identical to the general-talk map. Crime did move a bit closer to the Personal
Conversation Facet; education, on the other hand, remained at about the same place. Religion
fell a bit nearer to Bridge Facet; foreign affairs moved away slightly from the other political
variables. Overall, however, talk in the intimate circles of family and friends appeared to be
the model for the general talk variables. This finding suggests that talk in general and at home
represents not only the most frequent, but also the most typical, configuration for
conversation. Indeed, the maps for clubs and civic organizations, for place of worship, and
for commercial spaces seemed interchangeable with the maps for talk at home and talk in
general.
When we turn to the map for talk at work (Figure 2), we see a pronounced shift from the
typical general talk-home talk alignment, though the relative placement of variables remains
much the same. Although the hypothesized partitions fit the data exactly, crime and education
are now proximate to the Political Facet variables- where factor analysis also aligns them-and
the Political Facet and Bridge Facet variables are crowded into a corner. As factor analysis
suggested, crime and education are talked about at work more in terms of governmental
action than personal relevance. Personal affairs and religion, though talked about relatively
infrequently here, have drawn together, far from political and bridge talk.
This configuration suggests that, when personal matters and religion are spoken of at
work, the conversation is confined to intimate colleagues. We find a certain disjunction here
between the political and the private. Sports and entertainment, though talked about as much
as crime or education, stand off alone, separated from the rest of the personal and political
variables. In fact, at work, if any subject is talked about in great isolation from private and
public concerns, it is the fluff of sports and entertainment-not politics. Presumably, too,
sports and entertainment represent nonthreatening, nonserious, time-filling subjects for
chitchat, though sports, too, can take on heated connotations.
The place of worship, where principal components analysis extracted only one factor,
provided a bit of a contrast to the typical configuration for conversation, though again the
facets fit perfectly. Religion, here, has moved away from its isolated position toward the
Political Facet. Finally, in e-mail and Internet discussion groups, we find that the Bridge
Facet variables are proximate to the Political Facet variables, with religion moving toward the
cluster. Though religion is “talked” about least frequently in this locus, these results suggest
that its political dimensions are relevant to the focus.
All in all, our findings across the loci imply that political subjects are not discussed in
sharp isolation from other topics, a finding amplified by factor analysis. The “life-world” is,
hence, less easily divided into the public sphere and the family than some theorists might
imagine. Although the level and nature of talk shift from locus to locus, political conversation
and personal conversation form a continuum, with bridge variables providing common
ground.

The Amount of Talk in the Three Facets
To understand how the levels of political conversation compare with other topics in various
loci, we examined the means and rank orders of the nine specific topics across loci. Granted,
means are not the ideal measures of the central tendency of ordinal variables, but they are
convenient for ranking general priorities. As Table 1 makes apparent, the bridge variables of
crime and education achieve the highest overall rank orders. Crime scores first in general
conversation, at home, and at work; ranks second in commercial spaces and in organizations;
rates third at worship; and drops to sixth in computer-mediated communication. In most loci,
crime and education not only bridge the gap between the public and private spheres but are
also the most salient topics of conversation—challenging claims that political conversation
and personal conversation proceed by entirely different rules. The political conversation
variables range around the middle of the rank order across loci, with the economy falling
fourth; state and local government, sixth; national government, seventh; and foreign events,
ninth. Personal and family matters place in the middle of the rank order, scoring third in
general and at home, fourth at worship, fifth in commercial spaces, seventh at work, and
eighth in organizations. Except for foreign happenings, religion scores as the least-talked
about subject.
If any domain is talked about infrequently, it is not the public and bridge topics, nor
personal and family affairs, but religion, which is spoken about seldom except in its own
sanctuary-like space. People may say that they avoid talk about politics and religion like the

plague, but our results suggest that religion is the more guarded topic. Sports/entertainment
seems just the opposite. Scoring fifth and fourth in general and at home, talk about sports and
entertainment is the number 1 topic out in commercial spaces and the number 2 subject at
work, where such casual talk may fill time without threatening egos or invading personal
space.
Talk About Politics, Opinion Quality, and Political Participation
To show that our results represent more than just a theoretical construct in a typology of
conversation, we examined the relationship between Political Conversation and other

variables important to the public and political spheres.9 In particular, we sought to show that
Political Conversation in various loci was significantly correlated with the quality of
individual opinion and with political participation, when controlled for age, education,
income, gender, and newspaper and television news use. Assessing opinion quality is a
difficult matter subject to wide interpretation (Price & Neijens, 1997), but we felt that
respondents who engaged in higher levels of Political Conversation should hold more
opinions about specific political issues (termed “opinionation”) and should demonstrate a
higher quality of opinion (called “consideredness”).
Opinionation comprised an additive scale based on whether respondents gave answers to
questions about party identification, political orientation, the obligation of government to
provide a “decent living” for the unemployed, and, following a specific emphasis in the
survey, support for Medicare against budget cutting. Consideredness was based on
interviewer codings of reasons a random half of respondents gave to justify their answer
about cutting Medicare to balance the budget. The scale ranged from no reason given to an
awareness of both sides of an issue. Political participation was represented by a factor made
up of highly loaded items that included contacting candidates, attending political meetings,
working in campaigns, and the likelihood of voting in an upcoming election.
As Table 3 shows, political conversation in general, at home, at work, and in
organizations—and the combined political-personal conversation factor at worship and in
commercial spaces—displayed significant partial correlations with opinionation, when
controlled for status demographics and news use. Conversation, then, results in more
opinions about political issues. Given the fact that our political conversation questions asked
only for general estimates about the amount of conversation while opinionation was based on
responses to specific items, we judge this relation important.
Political conversation in general, at home, in organizations, and in e-mail was also
significantly correlated to consideredness, a variable based on interviewer assessment of
respondents’ reasons for holding a specific opinion, which was part of an experimental design
asked of a random half.
The combined Political-Personal Conversation Factor at place of worship also correlated
significantly with consideredness. Curiously, workplace conversation was not significantly
related to consideredness. We found the relation between political conversation and
consideredness striking, given the fact that the issue under consideration, though hardly
obscure, required some vigilance to understand.

9 To understand demographic correlates of Political Conversation, OLS regression was employed for each locus, using age,
income, education, gender, and newspaper and TV news consumption as predictors. Education was a highly significant
correlate of each Political Conversation factor except in civic organizations, Newspaper readership proved highly significant
in general, at home, at work, and in organizations. Television news played a role in the home and, to a lesser extent, in
general Political Conversation. Age played a negative role in worship and in commercial spaces. Maleness and income were
the least important predictors.

As Table 3 also shows, all of the political conversation and political-personal
conversation factors correlated significantly with political participation, with particularly
strong relations at home and in organizations. These correlations of conversation with
opinionation, consideredness, and participation testify to the integral role that ordinary
political conversation plays in democratic processes. Our findings also suggest that, although
civic organizations remain crucial, their reach is limited (35% of our sample) and the level of
conversation there (see Table 1) is lower than in the home, which may be the true seat of
democratic vice and virtue.

Summary and Discussion
Students of politics, such as Schudson (1997), Postman (1985), Eliasoph (1998), and
Noelle-Neumann (1993), argue in various ways that talk about politics, whether deliberative
or persuasive, is a form of discourse separate and apart from normal conversation because
talk about politics is difficult and divisive. Such formal deliberation or purposeful persuasion
must ideally proceed in safe, protected, even contrived environments such as public-affairs
organizations or legislatures—if it proceeds at all. In such places, rules and procedures guard
the politically weak and those in the minority from the predatory rhetoric of the strong and
the majority. Such rules, which also might encourage, in Habermas's (1962/1989) terms, a
selfless rational-critical public discussion, separate these modes of political discourse from
ordinary conversation. Other students of politics, such as Tocqueville (1840/1969), Bryce
(1891), Tarde (1901/1989), and Dewey (1927), have suggested variously that talk about
politics and everyday conversation meld together. They generally believe, and we concur,
that interlocutors shift readily from the discussion of political issues to aimless chat to
conversation about personal issues in a manner that does not markedly separate the public
from the private sphere, producing what we term ordinary political conversation. Here,
political topics are discussed, and sometimes debated, together with other common events
such as a spate of airline accidents, the quality of a movie, the cause of a child's failing grades,
or the prowess of the local coach.
The results of our study should reassure those who believe that ordinary political
conversation rests close to the soul of democracy, and that talk about public concerns
conducted in private, even among family and friends, has political consequences. Our data
suggest that national affairs, international affairs, state and local affairs, and the economy are
discussed with reasonable frequency (near “sometimes”) in general, at home, and at work,
though they are discussed less often at civic organizations, at worship, or out in commercial
spaces. Regardless of the subject, we found, respondents felt reasonably free to talk about any
of our nine subjects-perhaps because they talk mostly with people with whom they agree. We,
of course, believe that wider formal deliberation and purposeful argumentation would greatly
enrich democratic processes, but we also believe that informal political conversation is a vital
and often unappreciated component of political life.
Rather than belonging to the exclusive domain of public spaces, we found that ordinary
political conversation takes place most frequently in one's own home or the homes of friends
or family—that is, where most public media are consumed. Such ordinary political

conversation, importantly, was significantly correlated with opinion quality and political
participation. Conversation in familiar spaces is more than mere talk; though directions of
causation are likely to be multiple, conversation may lead to or result from better thinking
and greater action.
These findings appear to embody precisely what Morley (1990, p. 123) had in mind when
he urged scholars to “reframe the study of political communication in the media within the
broader context of domestic communication (involving the interdiscursive connections of
broadcast and other media, family dynamics, and gossip networks).” They fit well with Delli
Carpini and Williams's finding (1994, 1996) that people weave television content into their
everyday talk about political issues. They also mesh with Livingstone and Lunt's (1994)
argument that television talk shows function as forums for negotiation and compromise in a
public sphere far more informal and self-interested than Habermas envisioned. Our results
also challenge suppositions that personal spaces are weaker loci for talk about public affairs
than voluntary associations and community gathering places (Simonson, 1996).
Paradoxically, home appears to be an integral part of the public sphere- the very point, in
fact, where the public sphere and the family meet to form a life-world more integrated than
Habermas (1962/1989) conceived. This “inward” home, though increasingly connected to the
virtual world but isolated from its physical neighborhood, remains a primary space for public
business because media bring the external landscape to its confines (Gumpert & Drucker,
1998), It is as if mass communication has revived the salon, where conversation about crime
and education leads the agenda, followed by personal matters and entertainment, then the
economy, national, state, and local government, then religion, and, last, foreign affairs.
Within this electronic cottage, most subjects are spoken about on average at least
“sometimes,” At home and elsewhere, distinctively political subject domains (national, state,
and local government; foreign affairs) do not function in isolation from more personal issues
(family matters, entertainment, religion). As factor analysis and multidimensional scaling
suggest, they are spanned by “bridge” items (crime, education) that mediate between public
and private, Such ordinary political conversation—though not the structured disputation or
purposeful argumentation that some normative democratic theorists advocate—is associated
with greater action in the public sphere, questioning again Lazarsfeld and Merton's (1948)
classic assumption, supported by Hallin and Mancini (1985), that the American living room
is the place where broadcast news goes to die.
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